Supreme Court Judge: Only Courts Should Decide Judge Transfers, Not Government

From the Editor’s Desk

January 25, 2026

A sitting judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, has publicly stated that the transfer of judges is solely an internal matter of the judiciary and that government involvement in such decisions is constitutionally impermissible. His statement a recent instance in which the Supreme Court collegium, the body responsible for judicial appointments and transfers, formally recorded that a transfer had occurred at the executive’s request.

Justice Bhuyan made these comments while delivering a public lecture on “Constitutional Morality and Democratic Governance” at ILS Law College in Pune, as reported by Bar and Bench.  

The judge asserted that the transfer of judges is intended solely to ensure better administration of justice and should not be interpreted as punishment. He cited two transfers he had undergone, both of which he said benefitted him professionally, to illustrate that transfers need not carry negative connotations.

However, his concern focused less on the transfers themselves and more on how they are decided. He called the collegium’s acknowledgements, that a transfer had been made at the request of the executive, “very unfortunate,” and admission of governmental intrusion into a process meant to be insulated from political influence.

On August 25, 2025, the collegium recommended the transfer of Justice Gautam S. Sreedharan from the Madhya Pradesh High Court to the Chhattisgarh High Court. Less than a month later, the Union government sent a formal request asking the collegium to reconsider its decision. On October 16, the collegium modified its recommendation, proposing instead that Justice Sreedharan be transferred to the Allahabad High Court. According to the official record, this revision was made pursuant to a request received from the government.

The change significantly affected Justice Sreedharan’s institutional role. In Chhattisgarh, he would have remained among the top three judges, retaining his position on the High Court collegium responsible for appointments and elevations. At Allahabad, he moved lower in seniority and lost that position, effectively curtailing his influence within the judicial system.

In his lecture, Justice Bhuyan defended the collegium system, acknowledging its imperfections but maintaining that it was developed precisely to prevent the kind of political interference seen in earlier decades. He pointed out that while critics raise valid concerns about the system’s lack of transparency, it still serves as a safeguard against state capture of the judiciary.

The principle of judicial independence is a core idea in both political theory and constitutional law. It means that judges must be able to make decisions without facing pressure or interference from outside forces, especially from the executive branch of government. This principle is part of the larger doctrine of separation of powers, which holds that the executive, legislature and judiciary must operate independently of one another. The purpose of this arrangement is to ensure that no branch gains unchecked power, and each can act as a check on the others to protect individual rights and uphold the rule of law.

Transfers influenced by the government clearly threaten this balance by introducing external control over the careers of judges, which may lead to decisions that favour political interests.

The view that the judiciary should control its own internal functioning without interference from the executive is also grounded in the concept of institutional autonomy. In constitutional democracies, key public institutions such as courts, election commissions and audit authorities are designed to operate with both independence and accountability. However, institutions that decide disputes, interpret the Constitution and review the actions of the state require a higher degree of independence. This ensures they can protect rights and scrutinise government power without fear of retaliation or influence.

Further, Justice Bhuyan’s statement must also be viewed through the lens of constitutional morality, a concept rooted in B.R. Ambedkar’s vision of the Constitution. Constitutional morality refers to the commitment to uphold the values, structures and procedures enshrined in the Constitution, even when they conflict with political or popular preferences.

The collegium’s disclosure that a transfer was influenced by the government raises questions about internal judicial discipline and transparency. If the collegium willingly records a government’s request in its resolutions, it raises the possibility of the judiciary voluntarily compromising its own autonomy.

This is a more serious threat than external pressure because it suggests that institutional safeguards are weakening from within. As Justice Bhuyan put it, the “biggest threat… is from within,” implying that internal vulnerability can erode judicial strength more fundamentally than external attacks.

The issue also touches on what legal scholars call the “chilling effect.” If judges perceive that their career progression or location depends on how the government views them, they may self-censor their rulings, especially in cases involving the state.

Judicial independence in India is also tied to the country’s federal structure. High Courts function within individual states, but the appointment and transfer of their judges are handled through a centralised process led by the Supreme Court collegium, with approvals required from the Union Ministry of Law and Justice. This arrangement already limits the autonomy of the state-level judiciary. If the central government goes further and begins to influence transfer decisions, it concentrates power even more heavily at the centre. 

For appointments and transfers of High Court and Supreme Court judges, the Supreme Court collegium, comprising the Chief Justice of India and the senior-most judges, makes recommendations. These are then sent to the Ministry of Law and Justice, which processes the files, seeks inputs from intelligence agencies and relevant state governments (especially in the case of High Court appointments or transfers), and places the recommendations before the Prime Minister. The final approval is issued by the President of India, acting on the advice of the Union Cabinet.

Though the collegium is supposed to have primacy in this process, the Ministry of Law and Justice can delay action on a recommendation, return it with a request for reconsideration, or send feedback to the collegium before forwarding it to the President. This creates opportunities for the executive to exert indirect influence, even without having a formal veto. But such influence being acknowledged in collegium records, as in the Justice Sreedharan case, raises concern that the executive’s role has crossed the line from processing to interference.

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