Can Nepal Break Its Cycle of Revolutions?

More Than Better Leaders, the Country Needs Better Rules

By Vishal Arora

September 18, 2025

Nepal’s federal parliament building in Kathmandu after it was set on fire and vandalised. Photo by Vishal Arora

Nepal has recently toppled its government, the fourth such event since 1950. What matters now is recognising that these recurring storms are not caused by failed politicians alone. They come from a “state” that remains unreformed, no matter who holds power. Nepal can end its cycle of revolutions only by reforming the institutions that have blocked reform, protected the powerful and outlasted every elected government.

Recently, the government led by K.P. Sharma Oli of the Communist Party of Nepal, Unified Marxist Leninist, or UML, imposed a sweeping ban on 26 major social media platforms, where the “Nepo Kid” campaign had gathered pace among young people exposing the rewards of political lineage in a country where most face joblessness, poor education and fragile incomes. On Sept. 18, it triggered nationwide protests by students and young citizens against corruption and authoritarianism. Police used tear gas, water cannons, batons and also live rounds. At least 19 people, mostly youngsters, were killed, and over 400 were injured that day. The next day, public outrage erupted. The prime minister and his ministers resigned and disappeared from view.

Nepal has gone through three major revolutions before 2025, each bringing down a ruling order but failing to deliver lasting reform. In 1950, the first revolution ended the Rana regime and introduced constitutional monarchy. In 1990, the first Jana Andolan (people’s movement) forced the royal palace to restore multiparty democracy after decades of absolute rule under the Panchayat system. In 2006, the second Jana Andolan ended King Gyanendra’s direct rule and cleared the path for a federal democratic republic.

Political science has a name for the phenomenon in which the people act decisively, yet the state beneath the political change remains intact, creating a recurring loop. It is known as “institutionalism.” The idea is that political outcomes are determined not only by who holds office, but by the enduring systems through which power is exercised. These include the bureaucracy, the police, the courts and the regulatory bodies. They also include the informal arrangements that decide who receives benefits, who is shielded from consequences and how decisions are enforced.

Corruption in Nepal moves in both directions. At the bottom, citizens often pay bribes for basic services like land registration, school admissions or police reports. At the top, political leaders use appointments, contracts and budgets to reward loyalists and secure influence. These two levels feed each other. Officials at lower levels know their superiors are protected, while those at the top rely on networks below to deliver favours and loyalty.

“Path dependence” is another concept that helps explain why institutions remain resistant to change even after political upheaval. It is the principle that once a system adopts certain habits, such as promoting people based on party loyalty rather than merit, those habits become self-reinforcing. Individuals who rise through such a system have little incentive to change it. New governments then inherit institutions already conditioned by old practices. Over time, these institutions continue to function in the same way, no matter who is elected.

For example, Egypt removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011, but left the security services, the courts and the patronage networks intact. Within a few years, military-backed rule returned under a new name. Tunisia began its post–Arab Spring transition with popular support, but its state structures changed too slowly, and frustration returned as the economy faltered.

Another concept that completes the picture is “state capacity.” This refers to a government’s ability to carry out its basic functions, including delivering public services, enforcing laws without bias and maintaining order without relying on fear or force. In weak states, these functions break down. Police respond to political pressure rather than legal standards. Public services are handed out as favours. Corruption becomes routine. People experience the state not as a provider or protector, but as an obstacle. Even after an election or a revolution, the daily reality of being governed remains unchanged.

To build a strong state, institutions must be protected from political interference and allowed to function according to clear, lawful rules. Civil servants should be hired and promoted based on merit, not party loyalty, and public agencies must be accountable to independent oversight rather than personal networks or ruling parties.

Some countries have escaped the loop.

South Korea and the Philippines saw mass protests in the 1980s, followed by serious efforts to rebuild institutions. Courts were separated from executive control. Civil services were made more professional. Independent anti-corruption bodies were created. Citizens gained peaceful ways to hold power to account. These countries do not represent perfect models of governance, but the protests did lead to changes that endured.

There are also warnings.

Thailand remains stuck in cycles of coups and elections because the military and bureaucracy still hold the decisive levers. Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya protests unseated the Rajapaksas in 2022, but the state’s core financial and patronage structures have proved harder to dislodge, though the political atmosphere has improved.

Another concept that helps explain the failure of reform is the “principal-agent problem.” It suggests how citizens, as principals, delegate power to elected leaders and public officials, expecting them to act in the public interest. But when oversight is weak, these agents begin to act on their own terms. They use the authority they have been given to serve personal or political interests, not the people who entrusted them with power.

“Patron-client networks” make the problem worse. These are informal systems where jobs, contracts and protections are distributed through personal loyalty instead of legal procedures. Once these networks take root, they alter how government works. A minister begins to treat a department not as a tool for policy, but as a source of favours to reward allies.

“Elite circulation” adds another layer to the problem. It refers to the replacement of one set of leaders by another without changing the system they operate within. Even when new names enter high office, they face the same pressures, depend on the same networks and use the same methods to stay in power. Over time, their actions begin to resemble those they replaced. Elections bring a change in leadership, but not in how decisions are made or how the state functions.

Therefore, more than better leaders, a country needs better rules and ways to protect them from political capture. Removing individuals without changing how power is exercised does not fix the problem. Revolutions that only replace people leave the system intact. Revolutions that change the rules and rebuild the institutions give democracy a chance to last.

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