Is an India–Pakistan War Likely?

It’s Possible—But Only If Diplomacy Fails

May 1, 2025

The April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, which killed 26 civilians, has pushed India and Pakistan into one of their most dangerous standoffs in recent years. Daily gunfire is being reported across the Line of Control (LoC), diplomatic ties have been cut off and military activity is intensifying. Though there has been no formal declaration of war, the present situation carries all the signs of a serious military escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, revoked visa agreements and shut down the Attari border crossing. Pakistan has responded by closing its airspace to Indian flights, halting trade and expelling Indian diplomats.

Meanwhile, Indian security forces have launched a crackdown in Kashmir, with mass arrests and demolition of homes linked to suspects. On the military front, India has tested missiles in the Arabian Sea, and Pakistan has increased troop strength and allegedly downed two Indian drones.

Under international law, a full-scale war does not require a formal declaration. What matters is the presence of sustained, organised armed conflict between states. So far, there have been no confirmed aerial bombings or large-scale troop engagements beyond the border clashes, unlike the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot episode or the 1999 Kargil conflict.

The casualties since April 22 are primarily from the terror attack, not from battlefield combat. This places the current situation in the category of high-risk armed escalation, not yet full-fledged war. However, the risk of miscalculation is high—and rising. A mistake or wrong assumption by either side could unintentionally trigger a war.

Global actors including the United Nations, the United States and China, among others, have called for restraint. Beijing has called for an independent investigation into the attack, while Washington has urged both countries to avoid further military engagement. The tone of international responses suggests deep concern: while the world does not yet call it a war, it recognises how quickly this could turn into one.

But before this crisis spirals further, it’s essential to ask: what would war actually solve?

India and Pakistan have already fought four wars—in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999—along with numerous smaller military operations and near-conflicts. Each time, both sides have suffered heavy casualties, both military and civilian. What followed were fragile ceasefires, increased militarisation and deeper political hostility.

Kashmir has remained the most militarised region in the subcontinent. People there have lived through decades of lockdowns, curfews, internet shutdowns and violence—both from insurgent groups and state forces. The revocation of Article 370 in 2019, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its special status under the Indian Constitution, only deepened the political divide and inflamed tensions. Another war would worsen an already volatile situation, causing immense harm to a population already living under prolonged strain.

And war does not affect only border areas or battlefields. It disrupts life across both nations. Public money that should be spent on healthcare, education and job creation is diverted to weapons and troop deployments. Villages near the border face repeated evacuation, and displaced families lose homes and livelihoods. Trade routes shut down, industries slow and economies suffer.

A new layer of danger comes from nuclear weapons. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear arsenals, and any conflict—even one that begins with conventional weapons—carries the risk of escalation.

So what’s the alternative?

The only path forward is one that focuses on dialogue, not destruction. This doesn’t mean turning a blind eye to terror or letting perpetrators go unpunished. It means creating the political space and maturity to break the pattern – a terror attack takes place, India blames Pakistan or Pakistani-based groups, Pakistan denies involvement, India responds militarily, Pakistan retaliates and then, once international pressure builds, both sides step back, but nothing changes.

India and Pakistan may not be able to cooperate on intelligence-sharing or pursue independent investigation of attacks, but they can revive mechanisms that have worked in the past—like ceasefire agreements.

The 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan along the LoC was a considerable success. It significantly reduced cross-border firing and brought relative calm for several years. However, tensions surged again in 2016 and peaked in 2019 with the Pulwama attack and the subsequent Indian air strikes in Balakot, after which ceasefire violations rose sharply. In February 2021, the two countries renewed the ceasefire in a surprise joint statement, briefly reducing LoC incidents before tensions flared again.

Most importantly, the people of Kashmir must be included in conversations about their future. Currently, decisions are made over their heads, while they live under surveillance, suspicion and fear. No sustainable solution is possible without acknowledging their political agency and human rights.

Peace is not passive. It requires effort, honesty and leadership. It also demands restraint in the face of public and political pressure to retaliate. War might feel like a quick answer, but history shows it only deepens wounds and hardens positions.

A war is possible—but avoidable. Choosing not to fight is not a sign of weakness. It is a sign of wisdom, especially when the cost of error could be irreversible. The alternative is difficult, yes—but it is the only road that leads away from loss.